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T HAT HAVE COME to be called the rights of "fair trial and
free press" have received much attention in recent years,1 especi-
ally because of several highly publicized decisions handed down in
the midst of the Warren Court years.2 Since those decisions, although
few cases in this area have reached the United States Supreme Court
and many issues remain unresolved, a number of preventive and cura-
tive measures have been fashioned or suggested for dealing with the
problems of pretrial and midtrial publicity.'
The whole area of prejudicial publicity has not lent itself to
many clear-cut rules, being somewhat amorphous both in terms of
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1966; J.D., Harvard University, 1969. Mem-
ber, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Bars.
1. This article will discuss the problem of prejudicial publicity as it affects the
petit jury. For a discussion of the possibility of challenging a grand jury as being
tainted by pretrial publicity, see Ranney, Grand Juries in Pennsylvania, 37 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1975).
2. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
(first decision striking down a state conviction on the ground of prejudicial publicity).
3. For the leading effort to resolve some of the difficult problems in this area,
see ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as ABA STANDARDS]. See generally Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal
Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 Wm. & MARY L. Rlv. 1 (1971).
For a collection of articles on the recommendations of the ABA advisory committee
on fair trial and free press, see Symposium, 42 NoTRE DAME LAW. 857 (1967). For
a judicial study of the problems, see Report of the Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
(819)
1
Ranney: Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 21: p. 819
defining the problem and in terms of devising appropriate remedies.
Aside from the obvious uncertainties created by the tensions between
first amendment freedoms and the sixth amendment right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury, one partial explanation for the difficulties
in developing precise rules in this area is that different levels of
actual or potential prejudice are generally required in order to in-
voke the various remedies. Furthermore, different remedies may be
particularly appropriate for specific types of prejudicial publicity.'
The choice as to the proper remedy for prejudicial publicity'
is within the discretion of the trial court, and the judge's decision
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion which prejudices
the accused. 6 Since this choice "involves the balancing of fundamental
rights - the defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial
jury and the rights associated with a free press - this discretion
must be exercised with care."' Most courts have established an outer
parameter to the operation of the constitutional limitations in this area,
holding that dismissal of charges is not a proper remedy for prejudicial
publicity even where the normal remedies such as voir dire, a con-
tinuance, and a change of venue are unlikely to be effective.'
In spite of the difficulty of deriving general principles regarding
the impact of prejudicial publicity, several broad propositions have
4. See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1971) (remedies of
continuance and careful jury selection procedures not always sufficient to alleviate
prejudice such that change of venue may be required). See also notes 50 & 51 and
accompanying text infra.
5. Sometimes a claim of error in the denial of a request for one remedy will be
deemed harmless if counsel fails to use or request one or more other available
remedies. See note 63 infra. Similarly, the granting of one or more remedies may
be held to render harmless the failure to grant another. See iNebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976), wherein the Court stated:
Appellate evaluations as to the impact of publicity take into account what other
measures were used to mitigate the adverse effects of publicity. The more diffi-
cult prospective or predictive assessment that a trial judge must make also calls
for a judgment as to whether other precautionary steps will suffice.
Id. at 2805.
6. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, -_ Pa -......-- 352 A.2d 40 (1976), where the
court stated:
The procedure to be followed to ensure a fair trial in the face of prejudicial
publicity is clearly within the sound discretion of the trial court ....
Although the proper precautions are inevitably dictated by the circum-
stances of each case, they must reasonably ensure that no prejudice will occur.
Id. at ...... 352 A.2d at 48; cf. Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
7. Commonwealth v. Bruno _ .... Pa ------- ,----. 352 A.2d 40, 48 (1976); cf.
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douglas, 461 Pa. 749, 337 A.2d 860 (1975);
State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966). But see United States v.
Abbott Labs., 505 F.2d 565, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
See generally Stanga, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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maintained a somewhat uneasy coexistence for some time now. First,
qualified jurors need not be completely ignorant of the facts and issues
involved in a case.9 Second, a juror's assurances of impartiality
despite exposure to prejudicial publicity are not dispositive of the
accused's rights, and the defendant remains free to demonstrate "the
actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will
raise the presumption of partiality."' ° Finally, although a clearer case
of reversible error is presented when evidence in the voir dire record
shows actual jury prejudice due to publicity, such prejudice will be
presumed where the probability of unfairness is sufficiently great.'
9. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the Supreme Court stated:
It is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of com-
munication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public
in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is
particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any pre-
conceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be
to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside
his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court.
Id. at 722-23 (citations omitted); accord, Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975)
(juror exposure to news accounts about defendant's prior felony conviction and cer-
tain facts about the crime charged did not create presumption of prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Martin, Pa. , 348 A.2d 391 (1975).
10. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). In Irvin, as a result of massive
and extremely prejudicial publicity, 8 of the 12 jurors actually seated thought
defendant was guilty. The Court commented:
[I]t would be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconception of guilt
from his deliberations .... No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that
he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so
many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given
little weight.
Id. at 727-28. See also Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975) (dictum).
11. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 195, 303 A.2d 209, 212 (1973) (the
release by police of both the defendant's prior criminal record and his confession
to being "triggerman," and the staging of a reenactment were held to be inherently
prejudicial) ; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ; Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In Rideau, where a
20-minute film of the defendant's murder confession was broadcast three times in
3 days and three jury members had seen the broadcast, the Court noted:
[W]e do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized
transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due
process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a com-
munity of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview.'
Id. at 727.
In Estes, where the Court held that televising criminal proceedings over
defense objections violated due process, a plurality of the Court agreed as follows:
It is true in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require
a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice
will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.
Estes v. Texas, supra at 542-43. Compare Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975)
(where voir dire transcript indicated that no juror had fixed opinion as to guilt, the
3
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II. RESTRICTION OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND
PRESS PUBLICATION
Focusing first upon the preventive action which may be under-
taken, one significant area lies in the restriction of public statements
by those involved in the trial. In Commonwealth v. Pierce,2 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled:
[P]olicemen and members of the staffs of the office of District
Attorneys shall not release to the news media: (a) the exist-
ence or contents of any statement or confession given by the
accused, or his refusal to give a statement or to take tests; (b)
prior criminal records of the accused, including arrests and con-
victions; (c) any inflammatory statements as to the merits of
the case, or the character of the accused; (d) the possibility of
a plea of guilty; (e) nor shall the authorities deliberately pose
the accused for photographs at or near the scene of the crime, or
in photographs which connect him with the scene of the crime."8
A violation of the Pierce strictures does not, however, necessarily
dictate a new trial, for it "must also appear that the news accounts
[are] so 'inherently prejudicial' that the possibility of a fair trial
[is] questionable."' 4 Obviously, the appropriate pretrial remedy for
a Pierce violation would be a change of venue.' 5 Although the Court
in Pierce did not specifically so provide, it would seem that an excep-
tion to its dictates will be recognized for statements to the press
which are necessary to aid in the accused's apprehension, to warn
the public of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the investigation.'"
fact that some jurors remembered the crime and had knowledge of accused's criminal
background held to be insufficient evidence of actual or inherent prejudice), with
Commonwealth v. Bruno, . Pa. , 352 A.2d 40 (1976) (failure of trial judge to
sequester jury or question jurors to ensure that they had not been exposed to
prejudicial publicity held to be reversible error).
12. 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973).
13. Id. at 200, 303 A.2d at 215, citing ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at §§ 1.1, 2.1.
14. Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 306, 341 A.2d 91, 93 (1975) (news-
paper articles referring, inter alia, to defendant's confession deemed to be not of this
category, such that denial of a change of venue was not error where the jury selection
process eliminated any biased jurors) ; see Commonwealth v. Kichline, __ Pa.....
361 A.2d 282 (1976) ; Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 308, 304 A.2d 684, 688
(1973); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 225 Pa. Super. 370, 310 A.2d 360 (1973);
Annot., 22 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (1975).
15. In Pierce, the court stated that "a change of venue should have been granted."
451 Pa. at 192, 303 A.2d at 211.
16. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at §§ 1.1(a), 1.1(b)(1), 2.1(a),
2.1 (c) (1). An interesting question lies in whether an exception might also be recog-
nized for use of such statements to "smoke out" a dangerous confederate.
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The propriety of further restrictions upon statements by counsel
has been the subject of some dispute, especially as applied to state-
ments by defense counsel.' 7 The ABA Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press
(ABA Standards) set forth standards dealing with such statements
by counsel, these standards having been adopted, with minor change,
in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code),"
which is applicable in Pennsylvania courts.' 9 The ABA Standards
and the ABA Code deal with statements by counsel during pending
investigations,20 between the time of arrest and trial,21 during both
17. Sections 1.1 and 2.1 of the ABA Standards have been the focus for dis-
cussion. See 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 595 (1971). As to the per-
missibility of prohibiting public discussion of the case by parties, witnesses, jurors,
and judicial employees, see text accompanying notes 27-32 infra.
18. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT DR 7-107 (1975) [hereinafter cited as the ABA CODE].
19. PA. R. Civ. P. 205.
20. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 1.1; ABA CODE, supra note 17, at
DR 7-107(A). The disciplinary rule states in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication and that does more than state without
elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description
of the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the
victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance
in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
Id.
21. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 1.1; ABA CODE, supra note 17, at DR
7-107(B)-(C). This portion of the rule states:
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint,
information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest
until the commencement of the trial or disposition without trial, make,
or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communica-
tion and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including
arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or
to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused or his refusal or failure to
make a statement.
5
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the jury selection and the trial,2 2 and after the trial. 3  However, one
circuit court has held that court rules based upon the ABA Code
unconstitutionally infringe free speech to the extent that the rules
proscribed statements by counsel having only a "reasonable likeli-
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or
the refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examina-
tions or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence, or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of
the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information
necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of
any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use
of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence
seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court
in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
Id. For a case dealing with a first amendment challenge to DR 7-107, see Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
3201 (1976).
22. ABA STANDARDS § 1.1; ABA CODE, supra note 17, at DR 7-107(D). The
rule states:
(D) During the selection of the jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication and that relates to the
trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or
refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
Id.; see Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201 (1976) (phrase in the rule "or other matters" held
unconstitutionally vague).
23. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 1.1; ABA CODE, supra note 17, at DR
7-107(E). The rule provides:
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal
matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm
associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate
in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by public communication that is reasonably
likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
Id.
See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201 (1976), in which this provision was held unconstitutional.
6
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hood" of prejudicing a fair trial as opposed to posing a "serious and
imminent threat" of interference with the fair administration of
justice.24 Furthermore, since a common sense presumption of guilt
accompanies an indictment, and because of other differences between
the position of the prosecution and the defense, the ABA Code pro-
vision dealing with pre-arrest statements was held applicable only to
the prosecution, to guard against prejudice to the defendant's case.2"
Certainly, where the court does issue an order limiting statements
by counsel about the case, such action will generally be a factor sup-
porting denial of a change of venue. 0
. The rules of criminal procedure provide that in a widely pub-
licized or sensational case, the trial court, on motion of either party
or on its own motion, may issue a special order restricting extra-
judicial statements by parties and witnesses when such statements
would be likely to interfere with the rights of the accused to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. 7  Both free speech and fair trial interests
See also United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253 (4th Cir. 1974) (news articles
reporting that prosecutor intended to request maximum 70-year sentence for con-
victed drug pusher held no basis for new trial where district court said it would
impose sentence solely on the facts heard at trial, the presentence report, and coun-
sel's arguments).
24. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201 (1976).
25. Id. at 252-53. The court in Bauer noted:
Only slight reflection is needed to realize that the scales of justice in the eyes
of the public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against the accused after his
indictment. A bare denial and a possible reminder that a charged person is pre-
sumed to be innocent until proved guilty is often insufficient to balance the scales.
Id. at 250. The court in Bauer did not attempt to articulate precisely what standards
could constitutionally be applied to defense counsel at the pre-arrest stage. See id.;
6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIVIL LIB. L. REV. 595, 599 (1971) (both free speech and fair
trial interests infringed by silence order).
26. See note 5 supra.
27. PA. R. CRIM. P. 326; see Commonwealth v. Bruno, - Pa . .. ,-- .. 352
A.2d 40, 49 (1976) (rule 326 cited with approval in dictum). The obligation of the
court to restrict such statements was made clear in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 357 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he court should have made some effort to control the release of leads, in-
formation, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel
for both sides ....
More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged preju-
dicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or
take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the
identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief in
guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case ....
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff
nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be
permitted to frustrate its function.
Id. at 359-63 (citations omitted).
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of an accused may be infringed by an overly broad order of this kind
which is not necessary to meet a serious and imminent threat to the
fair administration of justice arising out of the publicity.28 The rules
also prohibit public discussion of pending or imminent criminal litiga-
tion by court personnel unless the matter is merely part of the public
records of the court.2 9  Likewise, the trial judge must refrain from
any conduct or making 'any statement that might interfere with the
right of the people or of the defendant to a fair trial." Both prospec-
tive jurors during jury selection8' and trial jurors8 2 should be told
not to express any opinion upon any subject connected with the trial
until retiring for deliberations.
The tensions between the sixth amendment right of an accused
to a fair trial by an impartial jury and the first amendment right to
free press are undoubtedly greatest in the area of court-imposed con-
trols on actual press publications. 8 In the landmark decision of
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,4 the United States Supreme
Court declined the invitation to establish a fixed priority between
these two rights. The Court found instead that on the specific facts
of Nebraska Press the traditionally heavy presumption against the
constitutional validity of a prior restraint on speech and publication
posed a formidable barrier to the validity of a court order restraining
pretrial publicity in the context of a criminal case. 5 This barrier
was not hurdled where the record failed to show either the probable
ineffectiveness of less restrictive measures or the probable efficacy of
28. See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); cf. Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d. 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201
(1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975). But see United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 867 (1969) ("reasonable
likelihood" standard held sufficient). See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3,
at § 3.5(c); Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62
A.B.A.J. 55 (1976); Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 948 (1970); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1041
(1970); 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 595 (1971).
29. PA. R. CRIM. P. 327.
30. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 2.4.
31. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 512(a) (1); see Hostetler v.
Kniseley, 322 Pa. 248, 254-55, 185 A. 300, 303 (1936).
32. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 513(b) (1); see Hostetler v.
Kniseley, 322 Pa. 248, 185 A., 300 (1936).
33. For a discussion of the propriety of television coverage of the trial, see
text accompanying notes 106-09 infra. As to the exclusion of the press and the
general public from certain pretrial and trial proceedings, see text accompanying notes
47-49 and 106-12 infra.
34. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
35. Id. The order prohibited the reporting to the police or third parties (except
to the press) of the existence or nature of confessions and other facts "strongly
implicative" of the accused. Id. at 2796.
826
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such prior restraints on publication.36 The Court, noting that first
amendment rights have never been deemed absolute, did not "rule
out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights
that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify re-
straint.""7  The Court also determined that to the extent the re-
straining order prohibited the reporting of evidence adduced at a
preliminary hearing which was open to the public, it was plainly
unconstitutional.88 Finally, the Court held that part of the order
prohibiting publication of information "strongly implicative" of the
accused to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." Thus, especi-
ally after the Nebraska Press Association decision, where there is no
clear threat or menace to the integrity of the trial, the courts should
refrain from controlling news coverage of a case, and the failure
to control press publication in such a case will not serve as the basis
for the granting of a new trial.40
Any attempt to control the press by means of the contempt
power will encounter serious first amendment objections. The courts
36. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, concurring, would have held more
broadly that courts can never impose prior restraints on the reporting of or com-
mentary upon pending criminal cases. They found no "conflict" with the sixth amend-
ment but only a "tension," and felt that "judges possess adequate tools, short of injunc-
tions against reporting, for relieving that tension." Id. at 2809, 2828 (Brennan,
Stewart & Marshall, JJ., concurring). Justice Stevens felt no need to choose
between the majority approach and the concurring, view, although he indicated that
he might favor the latter. Id. at 2830. It can be questioned whether Justice Bren-
nan's view is sufficiently sensitive to the possibility of undisclosed jury prejudice and
the "possibility of an injustice unredressed" or redressed only belatedly. Id. at 2801;
cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (conviction reversed after 12 years
of imprisonment).
37. 96 S. Ct. at 2808. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, elaborated upon
the possible nature of this showing:
In my judgment a prior restraint properly may issue only when it is shown
to be necessary to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial publicity that other-
wise poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly and irreparably, the impanel-
ing of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment requirement of impartiality. This
requires a showing that (i) there is a clear threat to the fairness of trial, (ii)
such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no less
restrictive alternatives are available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a restraint
may not issue unless it is shown that previous publicity or publicity from unre-
strained sources will not render the restraint inefficacious. The threat to the
fairness of the trial is to be evaluated in the context of Sixth Amendment law on
impartiality, and any restraint must comply with the standards of specificity
always required in the First Amendment context.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2807.
39. Id.
40. Cf. Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 833 (1969).
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have long held that utilization of the contempt power is justified only
where the out-of-court speech or publication constitutes a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice.4 However, the
ABA Standards recommend the use of contempt sanctions in specific
situations: when the press publishes a statement about the case "wil-
fully designed . . . to affect the outcome of the trial, and that seri-
ously threatens to have such an effect";42 and when the public has
been excluded from the courtroom but the press has been granted
access on certain conditions which the press subsequently violates.4"
Pennsylvania has two ancient and nearly forgotten statutes
dealing with contempt by publication. One statute provides that no
out-of-court publication concerning the conduct of the judges, court per-
sonnel, or participants in any case shall be construed to be a contempt
of court." The other statute provides that if any such publication
shall improperly tend to bias the minds of the . . . court . . .
jurors, witnesses or any of them, on a question depending
before the court, it shall be lawful for any person who shall feel
himself aggrieved thereby to proceed against the author . . . and
publisher thereof . . . by indictment . . ..
Regardless of the constitutional propriety of certain controls upon press
publication, the ABA Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press has proposed that the press be allowed notice and a pretrial
hearing before imposition of a judicial restriction on publication.46
41. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), and cases cited therein; see Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 208-19 (1971); Stanga,
supra note 3, at 38-43. See also Shaffer, Direct Restraint on the Press, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 865, 874-80 (1967).
42. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.1 (a) (i); see Commonwealth v. Martin,
--- Pa. -_, _ n.3, 348 A.2d 391, 398 n.3 (1975).
43. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.1(b); see text accompanying notes
47-49 & 106-08 infra.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 2044 (1962).
45. Id. § 2045; see Commonwealth v. Conroy, 69 PITT. LEG. J. 373 (Clearfield
Co. 1920) (expansive interpretation of statute in denying motion to quash indict-
ment). See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
158-63 (1969) ; Shaffer, supra note 41, at 875-80 (favoring use of such a statute
instead of general contempt power). However, it may be argued that this statute
is unconstitutional due to vagueness problems. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
46. See Landau, supra note 28; Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62
A.B.A.J. 60 (1976) ; cf. United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
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III. EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC FROM
PRETRIAL HEARINGS
Although the rules of criminal procedure provide for exclusion
of the public from pretrial suppression hearings at the defendant's
request,47 no general provision yet exists specifically relating to such
exclusion from part or all of any preliminary hearing, bail hearing,
or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case. The ABA Standards
recommend adoption of such a rule and would permit exclusion of
the public on the ground that dissemination of evidence or argument
adduced at the hearing might disclose matters that would be inad-
missible in evidence at trial, such that there would be a substantial
likelihood of interference with the right to a fair trial by an im-
partial jury.48 In a case where exclusion is ordered, the ABA
Standards also provide for creation of a complete record of the pro-
ceedings which would be made available to the public after disposi-
tion of the case."9
IV. CHANGE OF VENUE AND CONTINUANCES
Although a change of venue will not always remedy prejudicial
publicity problems, as where pretrial publicity is statewide ° or of
such a nature that it will merely follow the defendant, 1 and a change
may even impinge upon an accused's right to a speedy trial of the
vicinage, 52 under some circumstances removal of a case may be the
only remedy "sufficient to assure the kind of impartial jury guaran-
47. PA. R. CRIM. P. 323(f); see PA. R. CRim. P. 323(g) (providing for im-
poundment of the record from such hearing and nondisclosure except to the parties
and unless the interests of justice require otherwise).
48. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.1; see State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149,
450 P.2d 115 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of rule providing for mandatory
exclusion from preliminary hearing at defendant's request). See also Stanga, supra
note 3, at 36-38, 61-62; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1007 (1973). The Supreme Court has
commented on the problem of publicity arising from preliminary proceedings. In
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court observed:
It is contended that this two-day pretrial hearing cannot be considered in deter-
mining the question before us. We cannot agree. Pretrial [publicity] can create
a major problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed, it may be more
harmful than publicity during the trial for it may well set the community opinion
as to guilt or innocence.
Id. at 536; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
49. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.1; see PA. R. CRIM. P. 323(g).
50. See United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cohn, 230 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d
208 (1968); State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966).
51. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 725 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495, 498-508
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
52. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; see Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 569, 188 A.
574, 579 (1936) ("vicinage must expand itself" to meet need for an impartial jury).
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teed by the Fourteenth Amendment."" a Application for a change of
venue may be made by the defense counsel, the prosecution, or the
court on its own motion, when it is determined after hearing that
a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained in the county in which
the complaint was filed.54 It is settled that the grant or refusal of a
change of venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court.55
Aside from several somewhat conclusory rules of thumb as to the
impact of prejudicial publicity,5" appellate courts have considered the
following factors in assessing whether this discretion has been abused:
the length of time between the arrest and the trial ;5 the nature and
extent of the publicity (whether "inflammatory" or basically factual;
whether referring to matters which are or are likely to be inadmis-
sible at trial) ;s the prosecution's responsibility for the publicity;59
53. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971) (a continuance might be
ineffective and conflicts with the right to a speedy trial, and careful jury selection
might not guarantee an impartial jury). It has been noted that despite the fact that
a change of venue will often be especially effective, there is much judicial hesitancy
to allow a venue change due to its expense, inconvenience, delay and negative psycho-
logical impact upon the original forum. See Note, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue
in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925,
942 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Efficacy].
54. PA. R. CRIM. P. 313(a); see Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 88 A.2d
574 (1936) (upholding constitutionality of change of venue upon prosecutor's request).
Compare PA. R. CRIM. P. 313(a) (when it is determined that fair trial cannot be had
in the county), with ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.2(c) (when evidence indi-
cates a reasonable likelihood that fair trial cannot be had in the county).
55. Commonwealth v. Martin, __ Pa. , , 348 A.2d 391, 398 (1975) (collect-
ing cases). Compare id., with Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (trial court's
refusal to grant defendant's request for change of venue held to be denial of due
process where public was exposed to televised confession by defendant prior to
jury selection).
56. See notes 9-11 supra.
57. See Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 341 A.2d 91 (1975) (6 months)
Commonwealth v. Stolzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975) (trial occurred 1 year
after the crime and 3 months after codefendant's trial) ; Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445
Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971) (5 months). See generally Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541, 556 (1962); United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 941 (1973); United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 869 (1970).
58. See Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1975) (references to defendant's
prior criminal record and certain facts about crime held to be "largely factual in
nature") ; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (dissemination of clearly inad-
missible evidence by prosecutor) ; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (highly publi-
cized pretrial hearing) ; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (prior publication
of defendant's confession not prejudicial where confession was subsequently used at
preliminary hearing) ; United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 869 (1970) (publicity as to matters brought out at trial as competent evi-
dence); Commonwealth v. Martin, - Pa -...- - , 348 A.2d 391, 399 (1975) (while
publicity was extensive, it was basically "factual in nature"); Commonwealth v.
Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 307, 341 A.2d 91, 93 (1975) (despite reference to defendant's
confession, pretrial publicity held to be "wholly lacking in inflammatory content");
Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58, 63 (1971) (semble).
59. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966) ; United States v. Bon-
anno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); text accompanying notes 12-26 supra.
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the community atmosphere;60 the nature of the crime;61 the per-
centage of prospective jurors who were unaware of the publicity or
who had not become unalterably biased against the defendant ;62 the
defendant's use of at least a substantial portion of his allotted peremp-
tory challenges due to the amount of publicity ;613 the number of
jurors seated who had heard or seen the publicity;64 the trial court's
efforts to abate publicity;65 other precautionary or curative measures
taken ;"6 and the probable efficacy of a change of venue. 67 It should
be noted that a claim that venue should have been changed is not
waived by waiver of a jury trial or by failure to exercise all per-
60. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (fact that trial took place
2 weeks before a hotly contested election at which both the chief prosecutor and the
judge were candidates for judgeships was one of the factors considered); United
States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (loation within a less cosmo-
politan and more closely knit community may result in greater concentration of
publicity) ; cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1976) (semble)
Stanga, supra note 3, at 14-15.
61. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 353 Mass. 487, 232 N.E.2d 915 (1968) (re-
sponsibility to guard against prejudicial publicity is particularly serious in first degree
murder cases because of double function of jury to determine guilt or innocence and
to recommend the death penalty). Pennsylvania law provides for a change of venue
in the second trial of any felonious homicide where publicity as to the first trial
causes exhaustion of the regular panel of jurors without obtaining a jury. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 551 (1964). The application of this statute has been held to be dis-
cretionary, not mandatory, with the trial court. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa.
303, 313-14, 314 A.2d 242, 247-48 (1974).
62. See Commonwealth v. Martin, ___ Pa. __ 348 A.2d 391 (1975) (97 out of
107 prospective jurors questioned had some information about case, and 23 out of 221
admitted to having fixed opinions concerning guilt) ; Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462
Pa. 43, 337 A.2d 873 (1975) (31 of 139 prospective jurors admitted having formed
opinions as to guilt). Prospective jurors' claims of impartiality are not controlling.
See Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1975); text accompanying note 10
supra. Appellate courts frequently consider both ease and difficulty of jury selection as
positive factors, with the former being viewed as indicative of an impartial panel of
prospective jurors and the latter being viewed as a measure of the trial court's
diligence in ensuring a fair jury. See Efficacy, supra note 53, at 934.
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 144, 318 A.2d 680, 685
(1974) (fact that counsel exercised only 11 of 20 peremptory challenges held to weigh
against change of venue request due to prejudicial publicity); see Effcacy, supra
note 53, at 934-35. But see Commonwealth v. Dobrolenski, 460 Pa. 630, 636-37, 334 A.2d
268, 271-72 (1975) (dictum that a change of venue claim is not waived by failure
to exercise all peremptory challenges).
64. See Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963) ; Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971).
65. See Commonwealth v. Martin, -_ Pa. _, ___, 348 A.2d 391, 398 (1975)
(restrictions upon counsel and news media noted as a factor) ; Commonwealth v. Hoss,
445 Pa. 98, 104, 109 n.7, 283 A.2d 58, 62, 64 n.7 (1971).
66. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, -_ Pa. _ -, 352 A.2d 40, 51 (1976)
(dictum); Commonwealth v. Martin, ____ Pa. ,__ n.4, 348 A.2d 391, 399 n.4
(1975) (jurors immediately sequestered upon selection); Commonwealth v. Nahodil,
462 Pa. 301, 307, 341 A.2d 91, 93-94 (1975) (careful jury selection procedures and
use of cautionary instructions to jurors) ; note 5 supra. But see Groppi v. Wisconsin,
400 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1971) (continuance and jury selection procedures may be in-
adequate to render change of venue unnecessary).
67. See notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
1975-19761
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emptory challenges." Under the rules of criminal procedure, a
motion for a change of venue must be made no less than 10 days
prior to trial, unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the de-
fendant or his attorney was unaware of the grounds to so move. 9
Thus, although some courts have viewed a motion for change of
venue prior to voir dire as premature,7 ° defense counsel must be sure
to make any motion for a change of venue in timely fashion prior to
trial. A renewal of the motion after void dire is also good practice.
71
If a renewed motion is made after jury selection, the fact that a jury
satisfying the usual standards of acceptability has been selected ought
not to be controlling if there is a sufficient likelihood that the jury still
might not be impartial.7" A motion for a change of venue may be
supported by qualified public opinion surveys of individuals' opinion
testimony, 78 and is customarily supported by newspaper clippings,
video tapes, radio scripts, press releases and other evidence.74
The rules of criminal procedure allow prompt appellate review of
an order changing venue by either the prosecution or the defendant.75
In an extraordinary case, an order denying a change of venue may
be reviewed through an interlocutory appeal76 or extraordinary relief
in the nature of mandamus. Where a venue change is granted, the
choice of a new venue is generally within the court's discretion.78
68. Commonwealth v. Dobrolenski, 460 Pa. 630, 636-37, 334 A.2d 268, 270-
72 (1975).
69. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305; see Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. 552, 562,
326 A.2d 602, 607-08 (1974) (where the "vast majority" of the publicity occurred long
before defendant came to trial, motion for change of venue was not entitled to con-
sideration) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Martin, __ Pa-. , n.2, 348 A.2d 391 n.2 (1975).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 61 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
71. Cf. Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 373, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1968) (noting the practice of permitting the trial court to defer its final ruling on
a motion for change of venue until the jury is impaneled) ; Efficacy, supra note 53,
at 935 n.76. But see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.2(d).
72. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.2(d) ; see notes 10 & 11 supra.
73. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.2(c).
74. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 256 (3d ed. 1974).
75. PA. R. CRIM. P. 313(a).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.501(b) (1970) (must obtain permission of trial
and appellate court); PA. R. App. P. 1311-23. But see Commonwealth v. Swanson,
424 Pa. 192, 225 A.2d 231 (1967) (normally no interlocutory appeal from denial of
change of venue).
77. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967);
PA. R. App. P. 1502; see Marine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 373, 66
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968) (mandamus available even before jury voir dire). See also
Stanga, supra note 3, at 52-57; Comment, The Writ of Prohibition in Pennsylvania,
80 DICK. L. REv. 472, 485-87 (1976); 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89 (1969).
78. See State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1968) (dictum);
Note, Change of Venue in Criminal Cases: The Defendant's Right to Specify the
County of Transfer, 26 STAN. L. REV. 131 (1973) (arguing that present law uncon-
14
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If more than one change of venue is necessary in order to guarantee
the defendant's right to an impartial jury, such multiple removal
is required. 9
Much of the preceding discussion regarding a request for a change
of venue is applicable to a motion for a continuance, since a great
many cases deal with the propriety of a denial of both a continuance
and a change of venue. Thus it has been repeatedly held that "the
grant or refusal of a change of venue or of a continuance is within
the sound discretion of the trial [c]ourt."80
Under the rules of criminal procedure, the court may, in the
interests of justice, grant a continuance on its own motion or on
application of either party."1 An application for continuance on behalf
of the defendant must be made no later than 48 hours before the time
set for trial, a later application being allowable only when the oppor-
tunity to apply did not previously exist, when the defendant was unaware
of the grounds for the application, or when the interests of justice
require it. 2 An accused's failure to seek a change of venue is not
necessarily fatal to a claim of improper denial of a continuance.8 3
There are decided limits on the use of a continuance to remedy preju-
dicial publicity since continuances, particularly if they are repeated,
work against the important values implicit in the constitutional guar-
antee of a speedy trial.8 4
V. THE JURY AND PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
Compliance with the sixth amendment rights to an impartial jury
has given rise to various procedures designed to preserve this im-
partiality. In some cases, the defendant may wish to waive this right
to a jury trial entirely. In Pennsylvania, this waiver is permitted,
with the approval of the trial court, provided such waiver is "know-
stitutionally chills assertion of the right to a change of venue). See also 1 F. WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 48 (12th ed. C. Torcia 1975).
79. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 720-21 (1961); see ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 3, at § 3.2(e). A closely related alternative is the impaneling of a special panel
of prospective jurors from outside the county. See note 93 and accompanying text infra.
80. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, - Pa -... - --, 348 A.2d 391, 398 (1975) ;
Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 294-96, 234 A.2d 552, 559-60 (1967), vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 392 U.S. 647 (1968).
81. PA. R. CRIM. P. 301(a) ; cf. Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 731-32
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969) (court's failure to grant continuance sua
sponte found not to be error).
82. PA. R. CRIM. P. 301(b).
83. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952) (defendant's
failure to forego constitutional right to trial in original district held not to prejudice
claim of improper denial of continuance).
84. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) ; see United States v. Abbott
Labs., 505 F.2d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
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ing and intelligent."8 5 The ABA Standards recommend that a de-
fendant be permitted to waive a jury in a criminal case whenever
there is reason to believe that, as a result of the dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to increase
the likelihood of a fair trial.8"
Careful jury selection procedures may be utilized effectively in
an effort to ensure the impaneling of an impartial jury. Whenever
there is believed to be a significant possibility that prospective jurors
will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to prejudicial publicity,
voir dire inquiry as to whether they have read or heard anything
about the case must be allowed.87 It is preferable that such voir
dire take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective
jurors, especially once a prospective juror has admitted to some knowl-
edge of the case. 8 Such voir dire inquiry into pretrial publicity may
be properly limited to questions designed to discover whether a pros-
pective juror has a "fixed opinion" that the accused is guilty or
innocent.8 ' Knowledge of the case generally is a ground for challenge
for cause only where a prospective juror has such a fixed opinion."0
A trial court's utilization of careful jury selection procedures
may obviate the need for a change of venue.9 ' However, especially
85. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1101. The trial judge must conduct a colloquy to determine
that the waiver is properly made, and the colloquy must appear on the record. Id.;
see Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973) (colloquy required).
86. ABA STANDA S, supra note 3, at § 3.3; cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24, 37-38 (1964). But cf. United States v. Wright, 491 F.2d 942 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 862 (1974) ; Thwing v. South Dakota, 470 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Harris, 314 F. Supp. 437 (D.
Minn. 1970); United States v. Daniels, 282 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See
generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1957) ; 1971 Wis. L. REv. 626.
87. See Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 107-08, 283 A.2d 56, 63-64 (1971);
cf. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 48-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
858 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bruno, __ Pa. ___ 352 A.2d 40 (1976). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972).
88. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 440 Pa. 342, 269 A.2d 752 (1970) (failure to
permit such "private" voir dire held to be an abuse of discretion in view of pervasive
publicity) ; see United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 936 (1972). Compare Commonwealth v. Bruno,- Pa- . 352 A.2d
40, 52 (1976) (failure of trial judge to question jurors individually, out of presence
of other jurors, as to their exposure to publicity held to be reversible error), with
Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 146-47, 318 A.2d 680, 686, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1065 (1974) (decision to exclude selected jurors from courtroom during
voir dire is within discretion of trial judge, which discretion is not abused when voir
dire discloses no actual or potential prejudice, and jurors are not so excluded).
89. Commonwealth v. Martin, __ Pa -...... ,_ 348 A.2d 391, 403 (1975); see
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 136, 305 A.2d 5, 8 (1973).
90. Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 147-48, 318 A.2d 680, 686-87,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1065 (1974) ; see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.4(b);
note 9 supra.
91. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 307, 341 A.2d 91, 93-94
(1975); see note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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in view of the limitations upon voir dire, the method of jury selec-
tion may not always be adequate to guarantee an impartial juryY2
Finally, where there has been such prejudicial pretrial publicity that
it will be difficult to impanel a truly impartial jury, the trial court
may have a duty to draw jurors from other counties not so infected.98
Sequestration of jurors as -they are accepted and until their dis-
charge is a remedy particularly appropriate for a criminal case that
has attracted and is likely to continue to attract much news media
attention. In such circumstances, the trial court is afforded broad
discretion in determining whether to order such sequestration.
94
Although sequestration isolates jurors only after they have been ac-
cepted, it can mitigate the impact of pretrial publicity and impress
upon the jurors the importance of their oath. 5 However, since
sequestration of a jury may create resentment and may not always
be conducive to calm deliberations, sequestration need not and ordi-
narily should not be ordered sua sponte.98 Nevertheless, where seques-
tration of the jury has been ordered, a mistrial due to midtrial publicity
may be avoided.9 7 In fact, under the rules of criminal procedure, even
witnesses in a widely publicized or sensational case may be sequestered
on the motion of either party or on the court's own motion.9"
The trial court on its own motion, or at counsel's request, should
caution prospective jurors during jury selection, and the trial jurors
throughout the trial, not to read, listen to, or view any news reports
92. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) (change of venue may
be required) ; cf. Efficacy, supra note 53, at 933-37. The remedy of dismissal of charges
is not usually required. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
93. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 4.3(c); cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362 (1962) (court must take "strong measures" to protect the accused);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (statutory limitation on change of venue held
unconstitutional) ; United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 809 (1963 (discussing the propriety of drawing jurors from other counties).
94. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1111; see Commonwealth v. Bruno, _._ Pa. .__ 352 A.2d 40
(1976); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 203 Pa. Super. 34, 199 A.2d 139, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 902 (1964).
95. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1976).
96. See Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 833 (1969). But see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (sequestra-
tion should have been raised sua sponte). For a discussion of the disadvantages of
sequestration, see R. CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 9.08(2) (1969).
97. See Commonwealth v. Martin, __ Pa. , n.4, 348 A.2d 391, 399 n.4
(1975).
98. PA. R. CRIM. P. 326. There appears to be no hard and fast rule as to what
degree of exposure to publicity is necessary in order to warrant the sequestration of
witnesses. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that trial court
should have insulated the witnesses due to pretrial newspaper and radio interviews of
prospective witnesses); cf. United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1972)
(witness who was exposed to extensive pretrial publicity identifying defendant held
not to be disqualified).
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concerning the case, 9 and to decide the issues only on the evidence
presented at trial.' 0 The giving of such an instruction may obviate
the need for a new trial. 0 '
Where, in spite of whatever precautions may have been taken to
assure that prejudicial pretrial and trial publicity does not reach the
attention of the jurors, and to assure that they will disregard any
such information, it nevertheless appears that one or more jurors has
heard, read, or seen something prejudicial about the case, the trial
court must, upon request, question the jurors about their exposure
to such material." 2 When highly prejudicial material is publicized
during the trial, such inquiry should be conducted out of the presence
of the other jurors, particularly when the jury has not been seques-
tered.' It may be more prejudicial for the jury to become aware of
inadmissible evidence from outside sources than from an erroneous
evidentiary ruling during trial because of the absence of any pro-
cedural safeguards."0 4 Thus, where a juror has been exposed to such
potentially prejudicial material, he must, upon challenge, be excused
if reference to the material in question at the trial itself would have
required declaration of a mistrial.0 5
99. See UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 512(a) (3), 513(b) (3); cf.
United States v. Miles, 483 F.2d 1372, 1374 n.2 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 415 U.S. 970 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bruno, __ Pa. ____ n.12, 352 A.2d
40, 50 n.12 (1976).
100. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1976).
101. Compare Commonwealth v. Bruno, Pa. , .... 352 A.2d 40, 50-51
(1976) (precautionary instructions to jurors suggesting that they refrain from reading
or observing accounts of the trial criticized for equivocality in reversal of defendant's
murder conviction), with Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 307, 341 A.2d 91,
93 (1975) (instruction to jurors that they refrain from observing broadcast or news-
paper reports concerning the trial considered as a factor in affirmance of conviction).
102. Commonwealth v. Bruno, _._ Pa. ___ 352 A.2d 40 (1976). A trial court's
failure to so question the jurors may constitute reversible error. Id.; see ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.5(f) (court may also act sua sponte). But see
United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow defendants to
interrogate jurors held not to be reversible error where there was no basis for the
belief that jurors had been exposed to prejudicial information); Gordon v. United
States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971) (refusal to poll
jurors was not reversible error where trial court exercised sound discretion in finding
news accounts not to be prejudicial to defendant).
103. Commonwealth v. Bruno- ..... Pa -...---- ,-. -352 A.2d 40, 52 (1976). Compare
id., with United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 911 (1970) (separate and private interrogation of jurors who admit exposure
to publicity held to be required).
104. Commonwealth v. Bruno, Pa ------- , 352 A.2d 40, 49 (1976).
105. Id.; see United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973).
But see United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1957, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 929 (1972) ; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.5(f). See also
Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975); Commonwealth v. Dukes, 460 Pa. 180,
331 A.2d 478 (1975) ; Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1065 (1974).
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1975-1976] REMEDIES FOR PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
VI. CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES IN OR NEAR
THE COURTROOM
The rules of criminal procedure provide that in a widely pub-
licized or sensational case the trial court, on motion of either party
or on its own motion, may regulate the seating and conduct of spec-
tators and news media representatives in the courtroom. 0 6 Failure
to do so may result in reversible error in an extreme case. 10 7  The
rules also prohibit photography and broadcasting in the courtroom or
its environs during the progress of, or in connection with, any judicial
proceedings. 0s A violation of these rules might be reversible error
even without a showing of isolable prejudice. 0 9
In addition to any other circumstances which may warrant ex-
clusion of the general public from the courtroom during a trial,"0 the
public, including the news media, may be excluded from all or part
of a trial at defendant's request if it is likely that the defendant's right
to a fair trial cannot otherwise be ensured."' Exclusion of the public
is most likely to be necessary where hearings are held outside the
jury's presence and dissemination of evidence or argument adduced
at the hearing is likely to interfere with the defendant's right to an
impartial jury." 2
106. PA. R. CRIM. P. 326; see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.5(a).
107. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
108. PA. R. CRIM. P. 328. "Environs" is defined as "the area immediately sur-
rounding the entrances and exits to the courtroom." Id.; see In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251,
126 A.2d 679 (1957) ; Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970) ; cf. United
States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). See also PA. R. CRIM. P. 27(a) (1)
(similar prohibition applicable to preliminary hearing and summary trial).
109. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (televising of trial over defendant's
objection held to be a violation of due process despite lack of showing of isolable
prejudice) ; cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1962). But cf. Bradley v. Texas,
470 F.2d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally Monroe, The Case for Television
in the Courtroom, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 920 (1967) ; Stanga, supra note 3, at 29-34.
110. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. 457, 352 A.2d 509 (1975)
(exclusion to protect young rape victim) ; Commonwealth v. Waiters, 233 Pa. Super.
83, 334 A.2d 731 (1975) (exclusion to prevent retaliation against defendant).
111. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 714 (also providing for deferred
public access to a full transcript or sound recording of the trial) ; see ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 3, at § 3.5(d) ; cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super.
176, 138 A.2d 246 (1958) (defendant's right to public trial may be waived). The
Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n did not reach the constitutionality of such exclusion.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, at 2805 n.8.
112. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.5(d) ; see notes 47-49 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, if all else fails and "[i]f publicity during the proceedings
threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered.""' 8
A motion for mistrial" 4 must be made as soon as the basis therefor
is apparent or it will be deemed waived." 5 Where the claim of
prejudicial publicity has not been waived, competent evidence show-
ing that there is a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more
jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial publicity will neces-
sitate a new trial.11
The multiplicity of possible remedies for prejudicial publicity
and the sometimes complex interrelationship between them help to
make the problems in this area among the most troublesome and sen-
sitive faced by attorneys and judges in criminal cases. However, it
is hoped that the heightened awareness of these problems will result
in the increasing use of the various options available to courts and
practitioners to ensure the proper safeguarding of clients' rights.
113. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); see Commonwealth v.
Bruno, __ Pa....... 352 A.2d 40, 49 (1976).
114. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1118.
115. Miller v. Kentucky, 40 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1930).
116. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.6; see Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140 (1892).
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